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to enact such laws, the Court will allow the states to experiment with
different ways to rectify the effects of past discrimination."0
A. W. TURNER, JR.
Criminal Procedure-No Right to Counsel on Discretionary
Appeal
In Douglas v. California" the United States Supreme Court held
that the failure to appoint counsel to represent an indigent criminal ap-
pellant in his "one and only appeal" of right2 violates the fourteenth
amendment. The extension of the Douglas right to counsel to indi-
gents seeking discretionary state and federal review of their convictions
led to conflict in the circuits. 3 Resolution came in Ross v. Mo!fitt.4
56. Three cautionary statements are apposite here. First, as Justice Brennan
pointed out. the Florida exemption is neither mandatory nor automatic. That is, a wi-
dow, in order to receive the exemption, must apply for it. Whether or not a mandatory
reverse discrimination statute will be invid;ous is rot decided by Kahn. 416 U.S. at 359
n.5. It seems, however, that the distinction would make little difference. It is up to
the state legislature to draw the lines, see note 41 supra, and if it decides to remedy
the discrimination against all women who have suffered it rather than merely those who
apply for the exemption, then it is not the function of the Court to tell the state it can-
not draw its line there.
Secondly, the continuing validity of the statute involved in Kahn if and when the
effects of past discrimination are erased is a different question which is beyond the scope
of this note.
Thirdly, the effect that the passage of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment might
have on legislation such as Florida's tax exemption for widows is beyond the scope of
this note. There has been speculation on the issue, though. See, e.g., Brown, Emerson,
Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 903-05 (1971).
1. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
2. Id. at 357 (emphasis in original). The term "appeal of right" refers to review
by an anpellate court of the merits of a claim guaranteed by a state statute or constitu-
tion. The term "discretionary appeal" or "discretionary review" refers to review where,
although there exists a statutorv or constitutional right to seek review, the appellate
court may decline to hear the appeal in its discretion.
3. Compare Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600
(1974), with United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970) and Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965). See also United States ex rel. Coleman
v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1963).
4. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
1975] RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In reversing a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel, 5 the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend the Douglas right to counsel to discretionary appeals
in the North Carolina Supreme Court or to writs of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.
THE CASE
Moffitt, an indigent, was convicted of forgery and uttering a
forged instrument in two separate North Carolina prosecutions in Guil-
ford and Mecklenburg Counties. Both convictions were affirmed 6 on
separate appeals of righ 1 to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Moffitt's Mecklenburg counsel sought and was denied appointment by
the Mecklenburg Superior Court8 to petition for discretionary review9
to the North Carolina Supreme Court. The Guilford Superior Court,
however, appointed the Public Defender' ° to petition for such review.
After this petition was denied by the North Carolina high court, 1 Mof-
fitt requested the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
to assign counsel to prepare a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. This petition was also denied. Thereafter, Moffitt
sought federal habeas corpus relief1 2 claiming the State's refusal to ap-
point counsel both to petition for discretionary review in the North
Carolina Supreme Court of his Mecklenburg conviction and to prepare
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in his Guilford
conviction constituted a denial of due process and equal protection.' 3
5. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), noted in 4 MEMPHIs ST. L.
REv. 616 (1974), 27 VAND. L. REv. 365 (1974) and 9 WAKEn FOREST L. REv. 579
(1973).
6. State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971), appeal dismissed,
279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971) (Guilford); State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694,
177 S.E.2d 324 (1970) (Mecklenburg).
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (1969).
8. The superior court is a trial court with general criminal jurisdiction. Id. § 7A-
270.
9. See id. § 7A-31.
10. North Carolina provides for representation of indigent criminal defendants by
Public Defender Offices in the 12th (Cumberland and Hoke Cos.), 18th (Guilford Co.),
and 28th (Buncombe Co.) Judicial Districts. In the 26th Judicial District (Mecklenburg
Co.) counsel is appointed from a local Bar roster. See 1973 REPORT OF THE ADMiNIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA 96-100.
11. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).
12. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). The petitions were filed in the United
States District Courts for the Western (Mecklenburg) and Middle (Guilford) Districts
of North Carolina.
13. Moffitt's additional allegation that he had a statutory right to counsel based
on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451 (1969) was denied in the habeas corpus hearing. Moffitt
v. Blackledge, 341 F. Supp. 853, 854 (W.D.N.C. 1972). The Fourth Circuit, however,
agreed with Moffitt's interpretation of the statute but lacked jurisdiction to enforce state
statutory rights. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1973).
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The habeas corpus petitions were denied,' 4 and the cases were consoli-
dated for appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit unanimously held that due process required
appointment of counsel to indigents seeking discretionary review in
both state and federal systems.15 Reasoning that as the Bar has grown
there has been a correlative growth in -the ability of the courts to imple-
ment "basic notions of fairness,"'-" the court found in the context of
Douglas "no basis for differentiation between appeals as of right and
permissive appeals or between first appeals and second or third stage
review."'
7
The Supreme Court granted the North Carolina Attorney Gen-
eral's petition for certiorari' 8 and reversed.'0  Initially, the Court re-
viewed and analyzed prior cases representative of the "extensive con-
sideration ' 20 given to indigents' rights on appeal. This precedent was
viewed as falling into two distinct lines of cases. The first line, be-
ginning with Griffin v. Illinois,2' stands for the proposition that a state
violates the fourteenth amendment by granting an appeal right but
erecting financial barriers that arbitrarily cut off access to -that right to
14. Moffitt v. Blackledge, 341 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
15. The court expressed confusion over the basis of the Douglas holding. "If the
holding [of Douglas] be grounded on the equal protection clause, inequality in the cir-
cumstances of these cases is as obvious as it was in the circumstances of Douglas. If
the holding in Douglas were grounded on the due process clause, . . . due process en-
compasses elements of equality." 483 F.2d at 655. There was no explanation why the
court chose to ground its decision in due process. See id. at 654.
16. Id. at 655. This transition is illustrated by Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) (fourteenth amendment does not require appointment of counsel in every non-
capital state prosecution); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to coun-
sel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and is made obligatory on the states
by the fourteenth amendment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless rep-
resented by counsel).
17. 483 F.2d at 651. Judge Haynesworth noted that Moffitt had been repre-
sented by assigned counsel in his petition for review to the North Carolina Supreme
Court in the Guilford charge but not in the Mecklenburg charge and that there were
no guidelines for trial judges in exercising their discretion in these appointments. See
Brief for Appellant at 48a, Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1973). He implied
that, had a sufficient basis for consideration been laid, the court would have inquired
closely whether the denial of counsel to indigents situated similarly to those for whom
counsel was provided would in itself work a denial of equal protection. 483 F.2d at
652.
18. 414 U.S. 1128 (1974).
19. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority of himself,
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Douglas
wrote for the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
20. Id. at 605.
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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indigents.22 The Douglas line, however, represents a departure from
the "limited doctrine" 2 of Griffin by inquiring into the adequacy of
the indigent's adcess to the appellate system. Thus, the Court framed
the issue for determination in Ross as whether Douglas should be ex-
tended to require appointment of counsel to indigent defendants for
discretionary state appeals and writs of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
24
The Court then set out to clarify the previously unstated and con-
fused constitutional underpinnings of the precedent by explicating the
due process and equal protection bases of the Douglas and Griffin
lines.2" Due process concerns fairness between the state and the indi-
vidual. Provision of an appeal is completely within a state's legislative
discretion, 20 and unfairness does not automatically flow from failure to
provide counsel to an indigent for an appeal as it would if counsel were
denied during the indispensable trial stage.17  Therefore, North Caro-
lina would violate due process only by denying the indigent "meaning-
ful access"'28 to the appellate system because of his poverty. The de-
termination of "meaningful access" is to be made under an equal pro-
tection analysis.
The Court viewed the equal protection mandate as a matter of
degrees rather than absolutes. While a state is not required to elim-
inate all differences between rich and poor, 29 it may not adopt appel-
late procedures that "entirely cut off" an indigent's appeal or that
merely provide him with a "meaningless ritual" while the rich are af-
22. 417 U.S. at 607. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington,, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns
v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
23. 417 U.S. at 607.
24. Id. at 602-03. This note will examine only the issue of right to counsel on
discretionary state appeals. The Court applied similar reasoning in finding no constitu-
tional right to counsel for preparation of writs of certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, but declared that the Griffin and Douglas cases were inapplicable since
the right to seek access to the United States Supreme Court comes from a federal, not
a state, statute. Id. at 617. For a discussion of the federal approach to appointed coun-
sel see 9 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 579, 586-88 (1973).
25. See 417 U.S. at 609-16.
26. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
27. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court in Ross articu-
lated the distinction as follows: "[t]he defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as
a shield to protect him against being 'hauled into court' by the State and stripped of his
presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of
guilt." 417 U.S. at 610-11.
28. 417 U.S. at 611.
29. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxtrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107
(1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, L, concurring).
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forded a "meaningful appeal."30 The issue thus devolved to an exami-
nation of the indigent's status within the tri-level North Carolina appel-
late system .
3 '
The Court in Ross found several benefits available to an indigent
seeking discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
His appointed counsel, guaranteed on his first appeal of right by
Douglas, will have examined the trial record and prepared an appellate
brief. The intermediate court will have passed on the merits of the
appeal. In addition he approaches the supreme court armed with some
form of trial record and often with a court of appeals opinion setting
forth claimed errors. Finally, the appellant is given the opportunity
to make pro se submissions. These benefits were found sutficiently
meaningful relative to the wealthy appellant to work no denial of equal
protecton.32 Additional support for this conclusion was drawn from
the absence in the statutory standards of a requirement that the su-
preme court determine if "a correct adjudication of guilt '' were made
below.3"
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The equal protection-due process analysis examined in Ross has
been traditionally applied to determine the constitutionality of post-
conviction state procedures that seem to impinge on an indigent due
to his poverty.5 The first case in this area, Griffin v. Illinois,"U in-
validated a state procedure that required a criminal appellant to pur-
30. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
31. North Carolina employs a ti-level court structure including an intermediate
court of appeals and a supreme court. An appeal of a criminal coiviction lies as oi
right to the intermeaiate court except when a aeath or lite imprisonment sentence is im-
posed, m which case appeal hes directly to the supreme court. N.C. UEN. STAT. § 7A-
27 (1969). An appeal of right of a court ot appeals' decision to the supreme court ex-
ists only in criminal cases involving a substantial constitutional question or in which
there is a dissent. id. § 7A-30. In ail other cases review of court of appeals' decisions
is within the supreme court's discretion as defmed by statutory guidelines. Id. § 7A-
31(c).
32. See 417 U.S. at 614-16.
33. Id. at 615, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
34. Justice Douglas, for the three-member dissent, found the reasoning of the court
of appeals below, Morrit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), completely peisuasive.
He saw the pio se petitioner at a "substantial" disadvantage dua to tne complexities of
certiorari practice and the failure of the counsel-prepared court of appeals brief to ad-
dress the North Caiolina discretionary review criteria of public policy and jurispruden-
tial significance. See 417 U.S. at b19-21; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1969); J8oskey,
The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. Rlv. 783, 797 (1961).
35. But see Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
36. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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chase and make available a transcript of his trial to secure full appellate
review. There was, however, no majority agreement on the exact con-
situtional basis for the decision.3 7  This ambiguity remained in a series
of cases that relied on Griffin to strike down state practices imposing
similar contingencies between the indigent and a statutory appellate
right. 3
8
Douglas v. California9 first applied Griffin and its progeny to the
right to counsel. 40  Under scrutiny was the California practice of allow-
ing the intermediate appellate court to determine after ex parte exam-
ination of the trial record whether appointment of counsel would be
beneficial to the indigent or the court. Forcing the indigent "to run
this gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit"' 41 was held constitution-
ally impermissible, and the Court imposed -a duty on the state to pro-
vide counsel. The holding, however, was explicitly limited to the first
appeal of right.42  Predictably, the decision contained language evoca-
tive of both equal protection 43 and due process. 44
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Ross majority, viewed Griffin
and Douglas as analytically separable. To the Court, Griffin mandated
that states not "cut off appeal rights for indigents" while the affluent
37. Four Justices felt "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be af-
forded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy tran-
scripts." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter cast the deciding vote but
objected to this language. "Of course a State need not equalize economic conditions."
Id. at 23.
38. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam), inval-
idated a transcript procedure as a denial of "a constitutional right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 216. See note 51 infra. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959), invalidated the requirement of a twenty-dollar filing fee before the Ohio Su-
preme Court would entertain motions to invoke its discretionary review of an intermedi-
ate appellate court's decision in a felony case in language suggestive of equal protection.
See id. at 258. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), invalidated a four-dollar habeas
corpus filing fee in similar equivocal language. See id. at 710-11, 714. Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477 (1963), struck down an Indiana procedure where a prisoner could obtain
a transcript which was a condition precedent to a writ of error coram nobis only if the
Public Defender requested it as a violation of the "Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution." Id. at 478.
39. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
40. The Court could see no substantive distinction between denial of a transcript
and denial of counsel. "In either case the evil is the same: discrimination against the
indigent." Id. at 355.
41. Id. at 357.
42. Id. at 356.
43. "[W]here the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right
are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn
between rich and poor." Id.
44. "When an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a preliminary showing of
merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure." id. at 357.
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have "open avenues of appeal." Douglas, however, mandated stand-
ards of adequacy of the indigent's access to the appellate system."
Conflicts develop in utilizing this dichotomy to analyze these cases.
The Illinois practice struck down in Griffin did not "cut off" the indi-
gent's appeal. 'Rather, submission of the transcript to the appellate
court resulted in full review of the conviction as opposed to limited re-
view on the face of the "mandatory trial record" available as a matter
of right without cost.48  The Court in Griffin required the state to
furnish the indigent a transcript but left open an opportunity for the
states to develop less costly alternatives to the transcript that would still
afford "adequate and effective" review to the indigent.47 Thus the
Court was expressing the same concern for the quality of the indigent's
appellate rights as later echoed in Douglas.
There is much additional evidence of the novelty of the Ross view
of Douglas and Griffin. Prior to Douglas, Griffin was used disposi-
tively to determine unconstitutionality of other non-doorclosing state
appellate procedures. 48 After Douglas the adequacy of alternatives to
transcripts was tested by reliance on the principles in Griffin without
reference to Douglas.49 Indeed, Griffin has been used to set standards
of conduct for attorneys representing indigents on appeal to insure the
adequacy of the Douglas right to counsel. °
An alternative to the Court's belief that Griffin represents a
"limited doctrine"'51 is the view that Griffin, as the origin of a single
line of cases of which Douglas is a part, has developed a method for
determining the constitutional adequacy of a state's treatment of indi-
gents within its appellate structure. Unconstitutional treatment can
consist either of precluding access to the "open avenues of appeal"'5'
available to the wealthy 8 or of admitting the indigent without providing
45. 417 U.S. at 607. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
46. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13-14 n.2 (1956).
47. Id. at 20.
48. In Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam), two
years after Griffin the Court relied on Griffin to strike down a Washington practice of
granting a free transcript to an indigent only if the trial judge were satisfied that "jus-
tice [would] thereby be promoted." Id. at 215. The transcript was not a condition
precedent to appeal, but the Court felt that without it the appellant was denied effective
appeal. See id. at 216.
49. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
50. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
51. 417 U.S. at 607. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
52. 417 U.S. at 607.
53. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (per curiam); Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959).
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him a constitutionally adequate appeal.54
Ross consciously attempted to eliminate the confusion that has
surrounded the due process-equal protection principles applicable to
indigents' appellate rights since Griffin.55 Noting that "[n]either
clause by itself provides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result
reached!" 15 in the Griffin and Douglas lines, the Court viewed due proc-
ess and equal protection as symbiotic by virtue of "meaningful access."
The primary consideration is whether the state denies due process by
failing to provide the indigent "meaningful access" to the appellate sys-
tem, and this determination is made under an equal protection anal-
ysis. 57 This statement alone fails to achieve the clarity sought by the
Court. "Meaningful access" is treated as neither a substantive stand-
ard nor a term of art. The concept reappears in Ross as questions of
whether the North Carolina Supreme Court has an "adequate basis"
on which to make its decision -to review5 and whether ,the indigent
is given an "adequate opportunity" to present his claims.59
More significant than the bare statement of the relationship of due
process and equal protection is that the Court retained the methodol-
ogy of the Griffin and Douglas cases to determine an indigent's right
to counsel on discretionary appeal. The Court determined the benefit
available to the uncounseled indigent relative to the wealthy and com-
pared this disparity to principles of due process and equal protection.60
In its statements of these principles, the Court avoided mention of
language in Griffin -that the states must provide equally adequate appel-
late review for indigents and wealthy. Rather, -the Court twice re-
ferred"1 to the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Griffin who
objected strongly to this implication 2 and reaffirmed the idea ex-
54. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Long
v. District Ct., 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd.,
357 U.S. 214 (1957) (per curiam).
55. "The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never
been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amend-
ment." 417 U.S. at 608-09.
56. Id.
57. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.
58. Cf. 417 U.S. at 615.
59. Cf. id. at 617.
60. Cf. cases cited notes 56-57 supra.
61. See 417 U.S. at 606, 612.
62. See note 40 supra.
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pressed in Douglas that "[a]bsolute equality is not required; lines can
be and are drawn and we often sustain them.
'' 3
The implication is clear that the Court intended Ross to dispose
of future claims to a constitutional right to counsel on discretionary ap-
peal. The decision in Ross was reached, however, only after analysis
of the benefits available to indigents within the North Carolina appel-
late system. 4 The full impact of the case, therefore, can best be as-
sessed by identifying illustrative examples of the different state appel-
late systems to which the learning of Ross can be applied.
In determining whether counsel must be appointed to represent
an indigent under any particular state appellate system, the initial con-
sideration is whether state statutory 5 or case law 0 confers a right to
counsel. Ross not only affirmed the notion that states may provide
benefits beyond constitutional mandates, but also disclaimed that the
holding should discourage them from doing so.6 7  It is the extent of
the constitutional mandate that is in issue here.
The second step in determining the indigent's right to counsel is
a consideration of the particular appellate system, the point in that sys-
tem at which counsel is sought, and whether the appeal is discretionary
or a matter of right. First examined are the various situations arising
in the twenty-four state systems"" utilizing an intermediate appellate
court.(9
First appeal of right. Generally, an appeal of right lies to the
intermediate court in all serious criminal charges,70 although it is quite
common to find provisions bypassing the intermediate court giving an
appeal of right direct to the highest court where serious punishment
63. 417 U.S. at 608, citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
64. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
65. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-503 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-451 (1969). But see note 14 supra.
66. See, e.g., Hutchins v. State, 227 Tenn. -, 504 S.W.2d 758 (1974); Cabaniss
v. Cunningham, 206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965).
67. See 417 U.S. at 618-19.
68. The states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee, Texas, and Washington.
69. These systems were instituted primarily to relieve appellate court congestion.
See AMmuCAN JUDICATURE SocITy, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS (Report No. 20,
1968).
70. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 10, 11; ILL. CONsr. art. VI, § 6; WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.06.030 (Supp. 1973).
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is imposed.71 Douglas, neither extended nor overruled by Ross, dic-
tates appointment of counsel at this level.
Second appeal of right. There exist circumstances in which state
high court review of intermediate court decisions is also a matter of
right, thus giving two appeals of right. These appeals are triggered
by either a dissent in the intermediate court's opinion 72 the initial con-
struction of a state or federal statute or constitutional provision, 3 or
some preliminary showing by the appellant of a significant constitutional
issue.7 4 This situation is covered explicitly by neither Douglas nor
Ross. Although it is an appeal of right, it is a second appeal, and
Douglas was limited to the first appeal. 75 Ross declined to find a con-
stitutional right to counsel on a second appeal, but the appeal under
consideration there was discretionary.
Two factors indicate that the presence of a second appeal of right
is an insufficient basis for distinguishing Ross. First, Ross held that
the mere presence of a state right to seek discretionary review did not
of itself mandate appointment of counsel,70 thus, by analogy, the right
of second appeal should not control. Secondly, ,the benefits available
to the uncounseled indigent on his second appeal of right are substan-
tially the same as those that were available to Moffitt as he sought sub-
sequent discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The indigent has had benefit of counsel on his first appeal, and the
high court has a trial record, an intermediate cdurt opinion, and the
indigent's pro se submissions on which to make its decision. Thus
the appellant, in Ross terms, would have meaningful access to the
appellate system.
17
However, a distinction may be drawn between a right of appeal
at any level and a right to seek discretionary review. Once a state
grants a right of appeal, it makes a commitment to review the merits
of the claim, and the setting becomes clearly adversarial. The role of
counsel in an appeal of right is to argue the case before the appellate
court. It is unclear whether benefits available to the uncounseled indi-
gent will provide him an adequate opportunity to present his claims or
an adequate basis for the court to make its determination on the merits,
71. See, e.g., Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-120.21 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-27(a) (1969).
72. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (1969).
73. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
74. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(1) (1969).
75. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
76. Cf. text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
77. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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as opposed to a decision whether to grant review at all. Current
United States Supreme Court practice reflects this distinction by ap-
pointing counsel to indigents convicted of state crimes only after certio-
rari has been granted.
78
Second appeal discretionary. In most circumstances review of
intermediate court decisions is within ,the high court's discretion. It
was within this situation that the Ross case arose. In Ross, however,
the high court's discretion was governed by statute.70 While many
states similarly limit the scope of the high court's discretion by statutory
or constitutional" standards, in some states the discretion is unfet-
tered81 or merely defined by non-controlling statutory guidelines.8 2
This divergence in state practice seems to be of little assistance
in distinguishing Ross. The Court reached its decision that there was
no constitutional requirement to appoint counsel for indigents seeking
discretionary review prior to a consideration of the North Carolina
statutory standards. The Court was only "fortified in this conclusion 8'
by the nature of these standards; it did not reach its conclusion based
on them.8 4
In determining ,the right to counsel in the twenty-six states uti-
lizing the traditional two-level appellate system, the same consideration
must be given to the nature of the appeal right.
First appeal of right. In the vast majority of two-level systems,
appeal of all criminal convictions lies as of right to the high court.8 5
Douglas clearly controls here and requires that counsel be appointed.
First appeal discretionary. In a few situations the first and only
appeal from a criminal conviction is within the discretion of the high
court.8 " This presents another example where neither Douglas nor
Ross are apposite.87  While Ross reaffirms the principle that states
need provide no appeal at all, 8 here -the benefits available to the un-
78. U.S. Sup. Or. R. 53.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c) (1969).
80. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 4.
81. See, e.g., GA. CODE AN. § 2-3704 (1945).
82. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 315(a) (Smith-Hurd 1968).
83. 417 U.S. at 615.
84. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra,
85. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.010(a) (1962); Miss. CODb ANN. § 99-35-101
(1972).
86. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21.140(1), (2) (1971) (appeal discretionary
if sentence imposed is less than twelve months).
87. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
8. qe tt accompanying note 26 supra,
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counseled indigent include only a trial record and pro se submissions.
Conspicuously absent are the prior assistance of counsel in examination
of the trial record and preparation of arguments to the appellate court,
and an intermediate appellate court once passing on those claims.8 .
The inference is compelling that this -treatment falls below the line of
adequacy drawn in Ross, thus giving rise to a constitutional right to
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Over a decade ago the Supreme Court, examining the rights of
indigent persons, stated that "[the methods we employ in the enforce-
ment of our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which
-the quality of our civilization may be judged." 90  More recently, in
finding a sixth amendment guarantee of counsel at trial whenever there
exists a possibility of a prison sentence, the Court felt that "the adver-
sary system functions best and most fairly only when all parties are
represented by competent counsel."91  Ross v. Moffitt, in disposing of
a constitutional claim of right to counsel on discretionary appeals in all
but atypical situations, contrasts strikingly with these principles. A
state's highest court, as final arbiter of interpretation of state common
law, might provide the most meaningful review of a criminal convic-
tion.92 This fact is unaffected -by whether access to that court is by
right or discretion. Ross describes certiorari practice as a "somewhat
arcane art."98 If -this be -true, lawyers, not pro se indigent appellants,
should unravel its mysteries.
STANLEY D. DAVIS
Labor Law-Preemption of State Damage Remedies for Discharge
Since the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Rela-
89. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
90. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
91. Argersinger v. Hanlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
92. See, e.g., State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973), revg State v.
Dix, 14 N.C. App. 328, 188 S.E.2d 737 (1972) (modifying elements of common law
kidnapping relied on by lower court).
93. 417 U.S. at 616.
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